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Abstract— How can we protect the network infrastructure
from malicious traffic, such as scanning, malicious code prop-
agation, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks? One
mechanism for blocking malicious traffic is filtering: access
control lists (ACLs) can selectively block traffic based on fields
of the IP header. Filters (ACLs) are already available in the
routers today but are a scarce resource because they are stored in
expensive ternary content addressable memory (TCAM). In this
paper, we develop, for the first time, a framework for studying
filter selection as a resource allocation problem. Within this
framework, we study four practical cases of source address/prefix
filtering, which correspond to different attack scenarios and
operator’s policies. We show that filter selection optimization
leads to novel variations of the multidimensional knapsack
problem and we design optimal, yet computationally efficient,
algorithms to solve them. We also evaluate our approach using
data from Dshield.org and demonstrate that it brings significant
benefits in practice. Our set of algorithms is a building block
that can be immediately used by operators and manufacturers
to block malicious traffic in a cost-efficient way.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we protect our network infrastructure from ma-
licious traffic, such as scanning, malicious code propagation,
spam, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks? These
activities cause problems on a regular basis ranging from
simple annoyance to severe financial, operational and political
damage to companies, organizations and critical infrastructure.
In recent years, they have increased in volume, sophistication,
and automation, largely enabled by botnets that are used as
the platform for launching these attacks.
Protecting a victim (host or network) from malicious traffic
is a hard problem that requires the coordination of sev-
eral complementary components, including non-technical (e.g.,
business and legal) and technical solutions (at the application
and/or network level). Filtering support from the network is
a fundamental building block in this effort. For example, the
victim’s internet service provider (ISP) may install filters to
react to an ongoing attack, by blocking malicious traffic before
it reaches the victim. Another ISP may want to proactively
identify and block the malicious traffic before it reaches and
compromises vulnerable hosts in the first place. In either case,
filtering is a necessary operation that must be performed within
the network.
Filtering capabilities are already available at routers today
via access control lists (ACLs), which allow a router to match
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a packet header against rules [1] and are currently used
for enforcing a variety of policies, including infrastructure
protection [2]. For the purpose of blocking malicious traffic,
a filter can be a simple ACL rule that denies access to a
source IP address or prefix. To keep up with the high rates of
modern routers, it is important that filtering be implemented
in hardware: indeed ACLs are stored in the ternary content
addressable memory (TCAM), which allows for parallel access
and reduces the number of lookups per forwarded packet.
However, TCAM is more expensive and consumes more space
and power than conventional memory. The size and cost of
TCAM puts a limit on the number of filters and this is not
expected to change in the near future.1 With thousands or
tens of thousands of filters per path, an ISP alone cannot even
hope to block some of the currently witnessed attacks, not to
mention attacks from multimillion-node botnets expected in
the near future.
Consider the example shown in Fig.1(a): an attacker com-
mands a large number of compromised hosts to send traffic
towards a victim V (say a webserver), thus exhausting the
resources of V and preventing it from serving its legitimate
clients; the ISP of V tries to protect its client from the attack,
by blocking the malicious traffic at the gateway router G.
Ideally, G would like to assign a single filter to block each
malicious IP source. However, there are fewer filters than
attackers so aggregation is typically used: a single filter blocks
an entire source address prefix. This has the desired effect of
reducing the number of filters, but also the undesired side-
effect of blocking legitimate traffic originating from that prefix.
Therefore, filter selection becomes an optimization problem
that tries to block as many malicious and as few legitimate
sources as possible, given a certain budget on the number of
filters.
In this paper, we formulate, for the first time, a general
framework for studying filter selection as a resource allocation
problem. To the best of our knowledge, the optimal filter
selection aspect has not been explored so far, as most related
1A router linecard or supervisor-engine card typically supports a single
TCAM chip with tens of thousands of entries. For example, the Cisco Catalyst
4500, a mid-range switch, provides a 64,000-entry TCAM to be shared among
all its interfaces (48- 384). Cisco 12000, a high-end router used at the Internet
core, provides 20,000 entries that operate at line-speed per linecard (up to
4 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces). The Catalyst 6500 switch can fit 16K-32K
patterns and 2K-4K masks in the TCAM. Depending on how an ISP connects
to its clients, it can devote to each customer only part of these ACLs, i.e., a
few hundreds to a few thousands filters.
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Fig. 1. Example of a distributed attack. Let’s assume that the gateway router G has only two filters available to block malicious traffic and protect the victim
V . It uses F1 to block a single malicious address (A) and F2 to block prefix a.b.c.∗, which contains 3 malicious sources but also one legitimate source (B).
Therefore, the selection of filter F2 trades-off the collateral damage (blocking B) for the reduction in the number of filters (from 3 to 1).
work on filtering has focused on protocol and architectural
aspects. Within this framework, we consider four practical
source address filtering problems, depending on the attack
scenario and the operator’s policy and constraints. Our con-
tributions are twofold. On the theoretical side, filter selection
optimization leads to novel variations of the multidimensional
knapsack problem, and we exploit the special structure of
each problem to design optimal and computationally efficient
algorithms. On the practical side, we provide a set of cost-
efficient algorithms that can be used both by operators to block
malicious traffic and by router manufacturers to optimize the
use of their TCAM and eventually to optimize the cost of the
routers. We would like to emphasize that we do not propose a
novel architecture for dealing with malicious traffic; instead,
we optimize the use of an important mechanism that already
exists on the Internet today and can be immediately used as a
building block in larger defense systems.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we
formulate the general framework for studying filter selection.
In Section III, we study four specific problems that correspond
to different attack scenarios and operator’s policies: blocking
all addresses in a blacklist (BLOCK-ALL); blocking some
addresses in a blacklist (BLOCK-SOME); blocking flows
during a DDoS flooding attack to meet bandwidth constraints
(FLOODING); and distributed filtering across several routers
during flooding (DIST-FLOODING). For each problem, we
design an optimal, yet computationally efficient, algorithm to
solve it. In Section IV, we use data from Dshield.org [3] to
evaluate the performance of our algorithms in realistic attack
scenarios and demonstrate that they bring significant benefit
in practice. In Section V, we position our work within (a)
the bigger picture of defense against malicious traffic and (b)
related knapsack problems. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND FRAMEWORK
A. Definitions and Notation
Let us first define the notation used throughout the paper,
also summarized in Table I.
Source IP addresses and prefixes. Every IPv4 address i is a
32-bit sequence. Using the standard notation IP/mask we use
p/l to denote a prefix p of length l bits; p and l can take values
l = 0, 1, ..., 32 and p = 0, 1, ..., 2l−1 respectively. Sometimes,
for brevity, we write simply p to indicate prefix p/l. We write
i ∈ p/l to indicate that address i is within the 232−l addresses
covered by prefix p/l.
Blacklists. A blacklist (BL) is a list of N unique malicious
source IP addresses that send malicious traffic towards the
victim. Identifying which sources are malicious and should be
blocked is a difficult problem on its own right, but orthogonal
to the focus of this paper. We consider that the set of malicious
IP sources is accurately identified by another module (e.g.,
an intrusion detection system and/or historical data) in a pre-
processing step and is given as input to our problem.
An address is considered “bad” if it appears in a blacklist or
“good” if it belongs to a whitelist (set of legitimate addresses),
WL. The whitelist may or may not be explicitly given; in the
latter case, it includes all addresses that are not in BL.
Address Weight. In the simplest version of the problem, an
address is simply either bad or good, depending on whether
it appears or not in a blacklist respectively. In a more general
framework, a weight wi can be assigned to every address i
to indicate the importance of an address. We use wi ≤ 0 for
every bad address i to indicate the benefit from blocking it; we
use wi ≥ 0 for every good address i to indicate the collateral
damage from blocking it; wi = 0 indicates indifference about
whether address i will be blocked or not.
The weight wi can have different interpretation depending
on the problem. First, it can capture the amount of bad/good
traffic originating from an IP address and therefore the ben-
efit/cost of blocking that address. Second, wi can express
policy: e.g., depending on the amount of money gained/lost
by the ISP when blocking address i, the operator can decide
to assign large positive weights to its important customers that
should not be blocked, or large negative weights to the worst
attackers that must be blocked 2.
Filters. In this paper, we focus on source address/prefix
2The higher the absolute value of the weight assigned to an individual
bad/good address, the higher preference to block/not block that address. If
all good and bad addresses are assigned the same wg and −wb respectively,
then the ratio wg
wb
is a parameter that the operator can tune to express how
much she values low collateral damage vs. blocked malicious traffic. wi = ∞
(−∞) indicates that address i must never (always) be blocked.
i Generic IP address
wi Weight assigned to address i
BL Blacklist: a list of “bad” addresses
N Number of unique addresses in BL
WL Whitelist: a list of “good” addresses
p/l (or “p” for short) prefix p of length l bits (IP/mask notation)
i ∈ p/l address i that belongs to prefix p/l
xp/l ∈ {1, 0} indicates if a filter blocks prefix p/l or not
gp/l =
P
i∈p/l∩WL wi collateral damage from filtering prefix p/l
bp/l = |
P
i∈p/l∩BLwi| bad traffic blocked by filtering prefix p/l
Fmax Maximum number of available filters
zp(F ) optimal solution of subproblem considering
only addresses in prefix p and F filters
(or zp(F, C)) (and capacity C, in the case of FLOODING)
TABLE I
NOTATION
filtering. A filter is a simple ACL rule that specifies that
all addresses in prefix p/l should be blocked. Fmax denotes
the maximum number of filters available in TCAM for our
purpose, and is given as input to our problem. Notice that
filter optimization is only meaningful when the number of
available filters Fmax is much smaller than the number of
malicious sources N , which is indeed the case in practice (see
introduction and [1], [2]).
The decision variable xp/l ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if a filter is assigned
to block prefix p/l; or 0 otherwise. A filter p/l blocks all
232−l addresses in that range. This has the desired effect of
blocking all bad traffic bp/l = |
∑
i∈p/l∩BL wi| and the side-
effect of blocking all legitimate traffic gp/l =
∑
i∈p/l∩WL wi,
originating from that prefix.
B. Rationale and Overview of Filtering Problems
Given a set of malicious and legitimate sources, and a
measure of their importance (w’s), the goal of filter selection is
the construction of filtering rules, so as to minimize the impact
of malicious sources on the network using the available net-
work resources (e.g., filters and link capacity). Depending on
the attack scenario, and the operator’s policy and constraints,
different problems may arise. E.g., the operator may want to
block all malicious sources, or may tolerate to leave some
unblocked; the attack may be of a low rate or a flooding attack;
the operator may control one or several routers.
In the core of each filtering problem lies the following
optimization problem:
min
∑
p/l
∑
i∈p/l
wi · xp/l (1)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (2)
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (3)
xp/l ∈ {0, 1} ∀l = 0, ..32, p = 0, ..2
l (4)
Eq.(1) expresses the objective to minimize the total cost
for the network, which consists of two parts: the collateral
damage (terms with wi > 0) and the cost of leaving malicious
traffic unblocked (terms with wi < 0). We denote summation
over all possible prefixes p/l: l = 0, ...32, p = 0, ...2l − 1
by,
∑
p/l. Eq.(2) expresses the constraint on the number
of filters. Eq.(3) states that overlapping filters are mutually
exclusive, i.e., each malicious address should be blocked at
most once, otherwise filtering resources are wasted. Eq.(4)
lists the decision variables xp/l corresponding to all possible
prefixes; it is part of every optimization problem in this paper
and will be omitted from now on for brevity.
Eq.(1)-(4) provide the general framework for filter selection
optimization. Different filtering problems can be written as
special cases within this framework, possibly with additional
constraints. As we discuss in Section V-B, these are all multi-
dimensional knapsack problems [4], which are in general, NP-
hard. The specifics of each problem affect dramatically the
complexity, which can vary from linear to NP-hard.
In this paper, we formulate four practical filtering problems,
and we develop optimal, yet computationally efficient algo-
rithms to solve them. Here, we summarize the rationale behind
each problem and our main results. The exact formulation and
detailed solution for each problem is provided in section III.
[P1] BLOCK-ALL: Assume that a blacklist BL and a
whitelist WL are given; a weight is also associated with
every good address to indicate the amount of legitimate traffic
originating from that address. The limit on the number of
filters is Fmax. The operator wants to choose a set of filters that
block all malicious sources so as to minimize the collateral
damage. We design an optimal algorithm that solves this
problem at low-complexity (linearly increasing with N , i.e.,
the lowest asymptotical complexity for this problem).
[P2] BLOCK-SOME: Assume that the same blacklist and
whitelist are given, as in P1. However, the operator may be
willing to block only some (instead of all) malicious addresses,
so as to decrease the collateral damage, at the expense of
leaving some malicious traffic unblocked. She can achieve this
by assigning weights wi > 0 and wi < 0 to good and bad
addresses, respectively, to express their relative importance.
The goal of P2 is to block only those subsets of malicious
addresses that have the highest impact and are not co-located
with important legitimate sources, so as to minimize the total
cost in Eq.(1). We design an optimal, computationally efficient
(linearly increasing with N ) algorithm for this problem too.
[P3] FLOODING: In a distributed flooding attack, such as
the one shown in Fig.1, a large number of compromised hosts
send traffic to the victim with the purpose of exhausting the
victim’s access bandwidth. The problem is well-known and
increasingly frequent and severe. Our framework can be used
to optimally select filters in this case, so as to minimize the
collateral damage and meet the bandwidth constraint (i.e., the
total bandwidth of the unblocked traffic should not exceed
the bandwidth of the flooded link, e.g., link G-V in Fig.1).
The input is the same as in P1-P2, and the weights capture
the traffic volume originating from each IP source. We prove
that the problem P3 is NP-hard and we design a pseudo-
polynomial algorithm that optimally solves FLOODING, and
whose complexity grows linearly with the number of traffic
sources.
[P4] DIST-FLOODING: All the above problems aim at
selecting filters at a single router. However, a network admin-
istrator, of an ISP or campus network, may use the filtering re-
sources collaboratively across several routers to better defend
against an attack. The question then is not only which filters to
select but also on which router to place them. Here, we focus
distributed filtering, across several routers, against a flooding
attack. We prove that P4 can be decomposed into several
FLOODING problems, that can be solved independently and
optimally, one at each router.
III. FILTERING PROBLEMS AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we give the detailed formulation of each
problem and the algorithm that solves it. But first, let us define
a data structure that we use to represent the problem and to
develop all the subsequent algorithms.
A. Data Structure for Representing the Problem
Definition 1 (LCP Tree): Given a set A of N IP addresses,
we define the Longest Common Prefix tree of A, LCP(A),
as the binary tree whose leaves represent the N IPs and all
other nodes represent all and only the longest common prefixes
between any pair of IPs in A. The prefixes are organized in
a hierarchy, with shorter prefixes towards the root and longer
prefixes towards the leaves, so that the prefix corresponding
to a parent node includes the prefixes corresponding to its two
children.
An example is shown and discussed in Fig.2. The LCP tree
can be constructed from the binary tree of all prefixes, by
removing the branches that do not have malicious IPs and
then by removing nodes with a single child. It reduces the
storage for representing candidate prefixes by encoding those
prefixes that are part of a feasible solution [5] . We do not
claim novelty in this data structure but we describe it in detail
because we use it extensively in the design of the algorithms.
Complexity: We can build the LCP tree from N malicious
addresses by performing N insertions in a Patricia trie [5].
To insert a string of m bits, we need at most m comparisons.
Thus, the worst case complexity is O(mN), where m = 32
(bits) is the constant length of an IP address.
We will make extensive use of the LCP tree in all algorithms
in the rest of this section, as it provides a compact way to
represent feasible solutions and to efficiently select the optimal
one. Note that every node in the LCP-tree is a candidate prefix
p/l; for brevity of notation, we will use interchangeably the
notation p/l and its shorter version p.
B. BLOCK-ALL
Goal. Given: (i) a blacklist of malicious addresses BL
(ii) a set of legitimate sources (iii) weights assigned to each
legitimate source address indicating the amount of traffic from
that address and (iv) a limit on the number of filters Fmax;
select source address prefixes so as to block all malicious
sources and minimize the collateral damage.
Formulation. This can be formulated within the general
framework of Eq.(1)-(4) by assigning wi > 0 to good
addresses (the amount of legitimate traffic) and weight wi = 0
Fig. 2. Example of LCP-tree used in BLOCK-ALL. For ease
of illustration, consider a 4-bit (instead of 32-bit) address space,
i.e. from 0000 to 1111. Let BL = {0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 810, 11, 12} be the
set of malicious IPs, corresponding to the leaves of the binary tree.
All remaining IPs (1, 2, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15) are considered legitimate and
not explicitly shown. Every intermediate node represents the longest
common prefix (LCP) covering all malicious sources in that subtree;
it is associated with a cost measuring the additional collateral damage
caused when we filter that node, instead of filtering each of its
children. E.g. the LCP of malicious addresses 0=0000 and 3=0011 is
prefix 00**; if filter 00** is chosen instead of filters 0000 and 0011,
collateral damage of 2 is caused, because the legitimate addresses 1
and 2 are also blocked. Choosing a set of source prefixes to filter is
equivalent to choosing a set of nodes in this LCP tree.
to each malicious source. The goal is to minimize the total
cost, which in this case is simply the total legitimate traffic
blocked:
∑
p/l
∑
i∈p/l wi · xp/l =
∑
i∈p/l∩WL wi + 0 = gp/l.
Constraint Eq.(7) enforces that every malicious source should
be blocked by exactly one filter.
min
∑
p/l
gp/lxp/l (5)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (6)
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l = 1 ∀i ∈ BL (7)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. We search for solutions
that can be represented as a subtree of the LCP tree structure,
as described in the following:
Proposition 3.1: Given BL and Fmax, there exists an op-
timal solution of BLOCK-ALL that can be represented as a
pruned subtree of LCP(BL) with: the same root, up to Fmax
leaves, and non-leaf nodes having exactly two children.
Proof Sketch. The main idea of the proof is that every
feasible solution of BLOCK-ALL can be reduced to another
feasible solution that (i) corresponds to a subtree of LCP(BL)
as described in Prop. 3.1, and (ii) has smaller or equal
collateral damage. Clearly, every feasible solution, S, of Eq.
(5)-(7) can be represented as a pruned subtree of the binary
tree of all possible IP prefixes, with the same root and leaves
being the prefixes used as filters. Assume that S uses a prefix
p˜/l˜ which is not in LCP(BL). Therefore, either p˜/l˜ does not
contain any bad IPs or one of its two branches does not. In the
former case, we can remove filter p˜/l˜, as it is not blocking any
bad IPs. In the latter case, we can move the filter from p˜/l˜ to
the child that contains bad IPs. In both cases, we have a new
feasible solution, with smaller or equal collateral damage than
the original solution. Iterating this process until all prefixes are
in the LCP shows that any feasible solution can be transformed
to a feasible solution corresponding to a subtree of LCP(BL),
as described in the proposition and having smaller or equal
collateral damage. Therefore, an optimal solution, which is
obviously also a feasible one, can be transformed to that
form. Finally, we note that in every subtree corresponding to
a feasible solution, each node must have two or zero children.
The reason is that a node with only one child, would leave a
branch unfiltered in the LCP tree, which would leave at least
one bad IP unfiltered. Further details are provided in [6]. 
Algorithm. Algorithm 1, which solves BLOCK-ALL, con-
sists of two main steps. First, we build the LCP-tree from the
input blacklist. Second, in a bottom-up fashion, we compute
zp(F )∀p, F , i.e. the minimum collateral damage needed to
block all malicious IPs in the subtree of prefix p using at most
F filters. Following a dynamic programming (DP) approach,
we can find the optimal allocation of filters in the subtree
rooted at prefix p, by finding a value n and by assigning F−n
filters to the left subtree and n to the right subtree, so as to
minimize the collateral damage. The fact that we need to filter
all malicious addresses (leaves in the LCP tree) implies that at
least one filter must be assigned to the left and right subtree,
i.e. n = 1, 2..., F − 1.
For every pair of sibling nodes, sl (left) and sr (right), with
common parent node p, we have the DP recursive equation:
zp(F ) = min
n=1,...,F−1
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr(n)
}
, F > 1 (8)
with boundary conditions for leaf and intermediate nodes:
zleaf (F ) = 0 ∀F ≥ 1, zp(1) = gp ∀p (9)
Once we compute zp(F ) for all prefixes in the LCP-tree, we
simply read the value of the optimal solution, zroot(Fmax).
We also use the variables Xp(F ) to keep track of the set of
prefixes used in the optimal solution. In lines (4) and (10) of
Algorithm 1, Xp(F ) is initialized to the single prefix used. In
line (12), after computing the new cost, the corresponding set
of prefixes is updated: Xp(F ) = Xsl(F − n) ∪Xsr (n).
Algorithm 1 computes the optimal solution of problem
BLOCK-ALL: the prefixes contained in set Xp(F ) are the
optimal xp/l = 1 for Eq.(5)-(7). The proof is straightforward
based on the DP Eq.(8) and omitted for lack of space [6].
Complexity. Computing Eq.(8) for every node p and for
every F ∈ [1, Fmax − 1] involves solving N(Fmax − 1)
subproblems, one for every pair (p, F ), with complexity
Fmax−1 each. Proceeding from the leaves to the root, we can
compute the optimal solution in N(Fmax − 1)2. This bound
can be made tighter observing that we only need to compute
zp(F ) for F ≤ min{|leaves(p)|, Fmax}, where |leaves(p)|
is the number of the leaves under prefix p in the LCP-tree.
Using this observation, it can be shown that the computation
can be done in O(NFmax), which is essentially O(N), since
Fmax << N and Fmax does not depend on N but only on
the TCAM size. Thus, the time complexity increases linearly
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for BLOCK-ALL
1: build LCP-tree(BL)
2: for all leaf nodes leaf do
3: zleaf (F ) = 0 ∀F ∈ [1, Fmax]
4: Xleaf (F ) = {leaf} ∀F ∈ [1, Fmax]
5: end for
6: level = level(leaf)-1
7: while level ≥ level(root) do
8: for all node p such that level(p)==level do
9: zp(1) = gp
10: Xp(1) = {p}
11: zp(F ) = minn=1,..F−1
n
zsl(F − n) + zsr (n)
o
∀F ∈
[2, Fmax]
12: Xp(F ) = Xsl(F − n) ∪Xsr (n) ∀F ∈ [2, Fmax]
13: end for
14: level = level - 1
15: end while
16: return zroot(Fmax), Xroot(Fmax)
with the number of malicious IPs N . Within a constant factor,
this is the lowest achievable complexity, since we need to read
all N malicious IPs at least once [6].
C. BLOCK-SOME
Goal. Given: (i) a blacklist of malicious addresses (ii) a set
of legitimate sources (iii) weights assigned to all addresses,
which express relative importance and (iv) a limit on the
number of filters Fmax; block some source address prefixes so
as to minimize the total cost, including the collateral damage
and the benefit of blocking malicious addresses.
Formulation. This can be formulated within the general
framework of Eq.(1)-(4), by assigning to good and bad ad-
dresses weights wi > 0 and wi < 0 respectively, to express
their relative importance. The goal is to minimize the total
cost, as in Eq.(1), which in this case includes both collateral
damage gp/l and unfiltered malicious traffic bp/l.
min
∑
p/l
(
gp/l − bp/l
)
xp/l (10)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (11)
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (12)
Another difference from BLOCK-ALL is Eq.(12), which dic-
tates that every malicious source must be covered at most by
one prefix, but does not necessarily have to be covered.
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. We can leverage again
the structure of the LCP tree to characterize feasible and
optimal solutions, with a proposition similar to Prop. 3.1. The
only difference from BLOCK-ALL is that, because some bad
IPs can remain unfiltered, the pruned subtree corresponding
to a feasible solution can now have nodes with a single
descendant. We defer details to [6].
Algorithm. The algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 in that it
uses the LCP-tree and a similar DP approach. The difference
is that not all addresses need to be covered and, at each step,
we can assign n = 0 filters to the left or right subtree, i.e. in
line (11) of Algorithm 1: n = 0, 1..., F . We can recursively
compute the optimal solution as before:
zp(F ) = min
n=0,...,F
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr (n)
}
(13)
with boundary conditions for intermediate (p) and leaf nodes:
zp(0) = 0 ∀ p, zleaf (F ) = −bleaf ∀F ≥ 1 (14)
zp(1) = min
{
gp − bp, min
n=0,1
{
zsl(1− n) + zsr (n)
}}
(15)
Complexity. The analysis of BLOCK-ALL can be applied
to this algorithm as well. The complexity turns out to be the
same, i.e. linearly increasing in N as well [6].
BLOCK-ALL vs. BLOCK-SOME. There is an interesting
connection between the two problems. The latter can be
regarded as an automatic way to select the best subset from BL
in terms of the weights wi, and then run BLOCK-ALL only
on that subset. The advantage is that we do not need to search
for the optimal subset, which is automatically given in the
final solution. In the extreme case that much more importance
is given to the bad rather than the good addresses, BLOCK-
SOME degenerates to BLOCK-ALL.
D. FLOODING
Goal. Given: (i) a blacklist of malicious addresses (ii) a
set of legitimate sources (iii) the amount of traffic that each
generates (iv) a limit on the number of filters Fmax and (v)
a constraint on the link capacity (bandwidth) C; block some
source address prefixes so as to minimize the collateral damage
and make the total traffic fit within the link capacity.
Formulation.
min
∑
p/l
gp/lxp/l (16)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (17)
∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
(1− xp/l) ≤ C (18)
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (19)
where, gp/l and bp/l denote the amount of good bad traffic
from prefix p/l, respectively. Eq.(19) indicates that we are
interested in blocking some, not all, malicious sources, and
that we should not use overlapping prefixes. Before the attack,
the total good traffic t0 =
∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
could fit
within the capacity; after flooding, the total traffic exceeds
the capacity. Eq.(18) says that the total traffic that remains
unblocked after filtering should fit within the link capacity C.
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. We use the LCP tree
for all addresses BL ∪ WL. Furthermore, to account for
Eq.(18), we assign a cost, tp, to every node in the LCP tree,
representing the total traffic, tp = gp+ bp, generated by prefix
p/l.
Proposition 3.2: Given BL, WL, Fmax, and C, there exists
an optimal solution of the FLOODING problem that can be
represented as a pruned subtree of LCP(BL ∪WL), with the
same root, up to Fmax leaves, and such that the total cost of
the leaves be ≥ t0 − C.
Proof. The proof is along the same lines as Prop.3.1 [6]. 
Algorithm. FLOODING is a 2-dimensional knapsack prob-
lem (2KP), with an additional capacity constraint, Eq.(19),
that makes it harder. 2KP is a “very hard” problem: not only
it is NP-Hard, but also the existence of a full polynomial time
approximation scheme for this problem is unlikely to exist,
since it would imply that P = NP [7]. For FLOODING we
obtain the following hardness result:
Theorem 3.3: The optimization problem FLOODING in
Eq.(16)-(19) is NP-Hard.
Proof: It is obvious that FLOODING is in NP . To prove
that it is also NP-hard, we consider the KP problem with a
cardinality constraint:
max
∑
i∈I
pixi, s.t.
∑
i∈I
wixi ≤ C1 and
∑
i∈I
xi = k (20)
which is known to be NP-hard [4], and we show that it
reduces to FLOODING. First, note that any solution of the
above problem that uses F < Fmax filters can be transformed
to another feasible solution with exactly Fmax filters, without
increasing the collateral damage. Therefore, the inequality in
Eq.(17) can be replaced by an equality without affecting the
collateral damage of the optimal solution. Second, we define
x¯p/l = 1 − xp/l, F¯max =
(∑
p/l 1
)
− Fmax and we rewrite
the above problem:
max
∑
p/l
gp/lx¯p/l s.t. :
∑
p/l
x¯p/l = F¯max,
∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
x¯p/l ≤ C,
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
x¯p/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL
For a given instance of Problem (20), we construct an equiva-
lent instance of the above problem by introducing the follow-
ing mapping. For i = 1, . . . , N : −g¯ii = pi, (gii + bii) = wi.
For p/l that is not in the blacklist: g¯p/l = 0 and (gp/l+bp/l) =
C+1. Moreover, we assign F¯max = k and C = C1. With this
assignment a solution to the KP problem (20) can be obtained
by solving FLOODING and then taking the values of variables
xp/l such that p/l is in the blacklist.
Therefore, we do not to look for a polynomial time algo-
rithm. Instead, we designed the following dynamic program-
ming algorithm that optimally solves FLOODING.
Let zp(F, c) be the minimum collateral damage solving
FLOODING problem with F filters and capacity c:
zp(F, c) = min
n=0,...,F
m=0,...,c
{zsl(F − n, c−m) + zsr (n,m)} (21)
Complexity. The DP approach computes O(CFmax) en-
tries for every node. Moreover, the computation of a sin-
gle entry, given the entries of descendant nodes, require
O(CFmax) operations, Eq.(21). Therefore, the optimal solu-
tion, zroot(Fmax, C), can be computed in O((N + |WL|)C2)
time. The algorithm has pseudo-polynomial complexity since
it is polynomial in C that cannot be bounded by the input
length. More importantly, its complexity increases linearly
with the number of IP sources in BL ∪WL.
FLOODING vs. BLOCK-SOME. To see the connection
between FLOODING and BLOCK-SOME, let us consider a
partial Lagrangian relaxation of (16)-(19):
max
λ≥0
{
min
∑
p/l
[
(1− λ)gp/l − λbp/l
]
xp/l+ (22)
+
∑
p/l
λ(gp/l + λbp/l)− λC
}
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (23)
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (24)
For every fixed λ ≥ 0 problem (22)-(24) is equivalent to (16)-
(19) for a specific assignments of weights wi. This shows
that dual feasible solutions of FLOODING are instances of
BLOCK-SOME for a particular assignment of weights. The
dual problem, in the variable λ, aims exactly at tuning the
Lagrangian multiplier to find the best assignment of weights.
E. DISTRIBUTED-FLOODING
Goal: Consider a victim V that connects to the Internet
through its ISP and is flooded by a set of attackers listed in a
blacklist BL, as in Fig.1(a). To reach the victim, attack traffic
has to pass through one or more ISP routers; let R be the set
of unique routers from some attacker to the victim. Let each
router u ∈ R have capacity C(u) on the downstream link
(towards V ) and a limited number of filters F (u)max. We assume
that the volume of good/bad traffic through every router is
known. Our goal is to allocate filters across all routers, in a
distributed way, so as to minimize the total collateral damage
and avoid congestion on all links of the ISP network.
Formulation. Let the variables x(u)p/l ∈ {0, 1} indicate
whether or not filter p/l is used at router u. Then the
distributed filtering problem can be stated as:
min
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l
g
(u)
p/lx
(u)
p/l (25)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ F
(u)
max ∀u ∈ R (26)
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + b
(u)
p/l
)
(1− x
(u)
p/l) ≤ C
(u) ∀u ∈ R (27)
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (28)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. Given the sets BL,
WL, R, and F (u)max, C(u) at each router, we have the following:
Proposition 3.4: There exists an optimal solution of DIST-
FLOODING that can be represented as a set of |R| different
pruned subtrees of the LCP-tree(BL∪WL), each correspond-
ing to a feasible solution of FLOODING for the same input,
and s.t. every subtree leaf is not a node of another subtree.
Proof. See [6]. 
Algorithm. Constraint (28), which imposes that different
routers do not block the same prefixes, prevents us from a
direct decomposition of the problem. To decouple the problem,
consider the following partial Lagrangian relaxation:
L(x, λ) =
∑
u∈R
(∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + λp/l
)
x
(u)
p/l
)
−
∑
i∈BL
λi
where λi is the Lagrangian multiplier (price) for the constraint
in Eq.(28), and λp/l =
∑
i∈p/l λi is the price associated with
prefix p/l. With this relaxation, both the objective function
and the other constraints immediately decompose in |R|
independent sub-problems, one per router u:
min
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + λp/l
)
x
(u)
p/l (29)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ F
(u)
max (30)
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + b
(u)
p/l
)
(1 − x
(u)
p/l) ≤ C
(u) (31)
The dual problem is:
max
λi≥0
∑
u∈R
hu(λ) −
∑
i∈BL
λi (32)
where hu(λ) is the optimal solution of (29)-(31) for a given λ.
Given the prices λi, every sub-problem (29)-(31) can be solved
independently and optimally by router u using e.g. Eq. (21).
The dual problem can be solved using a standard projected
subgradient method, as discussed in [4]. Note, however, that
since x ∈ {0, 1} the dual problem is not always guaranteed to
converge to a primal feasible solution [8].
Distributed vs. Centralized Solution. The above formulation
lends itself naturally to a distributed implementation. Each
router needs to only solve their own subproblem (29)-(31)
independently from the others. A single machine (e.g. the
victim’s gateway or a dedicated node) should solve the master
problem (32) to iteratively find the prices that coordinate all
subproblems. Thus, at every iteration of the subgradient, the
new λi’s need to be broadcasted to all routers. Given the λi’s,
the routes independently solve a sub-problem each and return
the computed x(u)p/l to the node in charge of the master problem.
Even in a centralized setting, our distributed scheme is efficient
because it lends itself to parallel computation of Eq.(25)-(28).
IV. PRACTICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we use real blacklists to demonstrate that
filter optimization brings significant gain. The reason is that, in
practice, malicious sources appear clustered in the IP address
space, which means that a small number of filters is sufficient
to block most malicious IPs with low collateral damage, a
feature exploited by our algorithms [9]. Due to lack of space,
we only present limited simulation results; however, these
results demonstrate the above point, as well as some of the
structural properties of the solutions for BLOCK-ALL and
BLOCK-SOME, which are at the heart of our framework.
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Fig. 3. BLOCK-ALL: collateral damage (CD) normalized over the number of
malicious sources (N ) vs. number of filters Fmax. We compare Algorithm 1
to K-means. In particular, we simulated Lloyd’s heuristic for K-means, which
is NP-hard; we ran 50 runs to avoid local minima. We also run Algorithm 1
on two traces, those with the highest and lowest degree of clustering.
A. Simulation Setup
We analyzed a 61-day trace from Dshield.org - a repository
of firewall and intrusion detection logs from about 1,700 dif-
ferent organizations. The dataset includes 758,698,491 attack
reports, from 32,950,391 different IP sources. Each report
includes, among other things, the malicious source IP and
the victim’s destination IP. We looked at each victim (IP
destination) in the dataset; the set of sources attacking each
victim serves as a blacklist for our simulations and varies
considerably among victims. We also generated good traffic
arriving at a domain hosting 20 servers, each receiving an
average rate of 1,000 incoming good connections per second,
each connection generating 5KB of traffic; we selected the
good IP addresses according to the multifractal distribution in
[10].
B. Simulation Results
BLOCK-ALL. In Fig. 3, we chose two victims, each attacked
by a large number (up to 100,000) of malicious IPs in a single
day; we picked these particular two, because the correspond-
ing blacklists exhibit the highest and the lowest degree of
attack source clustering observed in the entire dataset. We ran
Algorithm 1 on the two blacklists and made the following
observations, Fig. 3: First, the optimal algorithm performs
significantly better than a generic clustering algorithm that
does not exploit the structure of IP prefixes. In particular, it
reduces the collateral damage (CD) by up to 85% compared to
K-means, when run on the same blacklist. Second, the degree
of clustering in a blacklist matters: the CD is lowest (highest)
in the blacklist with highest (lowest) degree of clustering,
respectively. Results obtained for other victim destinations and
days were similar and lied in between these two extremes.
A few thousand filters were sufficient to significantly reduce
collateral damage (CD) in all cases.
BLOCK-SOME. In Fig. 4, we focus on the blacklist with the
least clustering and thus the highest CD (dashed line in Fig. 3).
In this worst-case scenario, an alternative to BLOCK-ALL is
BLOCK-SOME, which allows the operator to trade-off lower
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Fig. 4. BLOCK-SOME. (a) Collateral damage (CD) (b) number of unblocked
bad IPs (UBIP) (c) total cost (CD − W · UBIP ). The operator expresses
relative tolerance to UBIP vs. CD by tuning the weight W = wb
wa
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considered a higher (214) and a lower (210) value of W .
CD for unblocked bad IPs (UBIP) by appropriately tuning
the weights. We ran the BLOCK-SOME algorithm on this
blacklist, assigning, for simplicity, the same weights wg and
wb to every good and bad source. Fig. 4 shows the results: In
Fig. 4(a), the CD is always smaller than the corresponding CD
in Fig. 3; they become equal only when we block all bad IPs.
In Fig. 4(b), we see that BLOCK-SOME reduces the CD by
60% compared to BLOCK-ALL, while leaving unblocked only
10% of bad IPs and using only a few hundred filters. In the
data we analyzed, we observed that CD tends to first increase,
then decrease with Fmax, while UBIP tends to decrease.3 The
ratio wb/wg captures the effort made by BLOCK-SOME to
block all bad IPs and become similar to BLOCK-ALL.
Simulations for FLOODING and DIST-FILTERING will
be included in the extended version. However, as already
mentioned, these problems are also based on BLOCK-SOME
and can therefore leverage the clustering inherent in blacklists.
V. OUR WORK IN PERSPECTIVE
A. The Bigger Picture of Defense against Malicious Traffic
Dealing with malicious traffic is a hard problem that re-
quires the cooperation of several components. In this paper,
we did not propose a novel solution; instead, we optimized the
use of filtering - a mechanism that already exists in the Internet
today and is a necessary building block of any bigger solution.
We focused on the optimal selection of filtering rules, which
can then be installed and propagated by filtering protocols
[11], [12]. We rely on a detection module to distinguish good
from bad traffic and provide us with a blacklist. Detection is
a difficult but orthogonal problem to the contribution of this
paper.
3We can explain this as follows. When a new filter is available, the new
optimal solution can be constructed by (i) blocking a new cluster of bad
IPs (ii) splitting a blocked cluster into two filters or (iii) a combination of
(i)&(ii)& merging of existing filters. For small Fmax, option (i) is dominant:
the inherent clustering allows to find a cluster that is not blocked yet; this
increases CD and reduces UBIP. When this is not possible, option (ii) becomes
dominant, CD decreases and UBIP remains constant or decreases slowly.
We also consider addresses in the blacklist to be true and
not spoofed. This is a reasonable assumption today, because
attackers have the luxury to use botnets that involve large
numbers of infected hosts, so that they do not need to use
spoofing In 2005, less than 20% of addresses were spoofable
[13], while in 2008, only 7% of addresses in Dshield logs
were found likely to have been spoofed [9]. Looking into the
future, there is also a number of proposals for enforcing source
accountability, including ingress filtering [14], self-certifying
addresses [15], and packet passports [16].
A practical deployment scenario is that of a single network
under the same administrative authority, such as an ISP or
campus network. The operator can use our algorithms to create
filtering rules, at a single or at several routers, in order to
optimize the use of its own resources and defend against an
attack in a cost-efficient way. Our distributed algorithm may
also prove useful, not only for a distributed protocol of routers
within the same ISP, but also in the future, when different ISPs
start cooperating against common enemies.
The following papers are related to our work. In [17], source
filtering via ACLs was studied against DDoS attacks; however,
the filters were heuristically selected and the approach was
entirely simulation-based. There is a body of work on firewall
rule configuration [18], which focuses on management and
misconfigurations, not on resource allocation. Furthermore,
they consider firewalls for enterprises, which are not supposed
to be accessed from outside and thus can be protected without
filtering rules. In an earlier workshop paper [19], we also
studied optimal source-based filtering by aggregating source
addresses into continuous ranges, not prefixes. This allowed for
greedy solutions but does not reflect the ACL specifications.
B. Relation to Knapsack Problems
Optimal filter selection belongs to the family of multidimen-
sional knapsack problems (dKP) [4]. The general dKP problem
is well known to be NP-hard. The most relevant variation to
us is the knapsack with cardinality constraint (1.5KP) [20],
which has d = 2 constraints, one of them being a limit on
the number of items:
∑
j∈N wjxj ≤ C,
∑
j∈N xj ≤ k. The
1.5KP problem is also NP-hard.dKP problems with correlation
between items have been studied in [21], where the items
were partitioned into classes and up to one item per class was
picked. In our case, a class is the set of all prefixes covering a
certain address. Each item (prefix) can belong simultaneously
to any number of classes, from one class (/32 address) to all
classes (/0 prefix). To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to tackle the case where the items belong to classes that
are not a partition of the set of items. In summary, the special
structure of filtering problems, i.e., the hierarchy and overlap
of candidate prefixes, leads to novel variations of dKP that
could not be solved using existing methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a formal framework for study-
ing filtering problems rooted at the theory of the knapsack
problem and providing a novel extension of it. Within this
framework, we formulated four practical problems, and we
designed optimal yet low-complexity (linear in the input size)
algorithms that solve them. We also highlighted connections
between the different problems: at the heart of all problems
lies BLOCK-SOME; BLOCK-ALL and FLOODING are spe-
cial instances for specific assignment of weights, and DIST-
FLOODING can be decomposed into several independent
FLOODING problems. Finally, we did simulations using
Dshield traces; a key insight was that our algorithms can
exploit the spatial clustering that is inherent in real blacklists.
There are several directions for future work. We plan to ex-
tend the framework to dynamically update the filtering rules as
blacklists change over time, combine source- with destination-
based filtering, deal with adversarial scenarios, and study the
interaction between filtering and detection mechanisms. We
will also provide a more extensive experimental evaluation,
which was not the focus of this paper.
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